(Stockholm School of Economics)

Abstract: We present a theory for stochastic control problems which, in various ways, are time inconsistent in the sense that they do not admit a Bellman optimality principle. We attach these problems by viewing them within a game theoretic framework, and we look for subgame perfect Nash equilibrium points. For a general controlled Markov process and a fairly general objective functional we derive an extension of the standard Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation, in the form of a system of non-linear equations, for the determination for the equilibrium strategy as well as the equilibrium value function. We prove that for every time inconsistent problem, there exists an associated time consistent problem such that the optimal control and the optimal value function for the consistent problem coincides with the equilibrium control and value function respectively for the time inconsistent problem. We also study some concrete examples.

Notice: FINANCIAL MATHEMATICS Seminar

Monday, September 27, 2010

Time: 15h00

Room: Sala Unicre, Edificio Quelhas, ISEG

http://cemapre.iseg.ulisboa.pt/seminars/cemapre/

Monday, September 27, 2010

Time: 15h00

Room: Sala Unicre, Edificio Quelhas, ISEG

http://cemapre.iseg.ulisboa.pt/seminars/cemapre/